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The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
ended the entitlement to cash assistance and requires welfare recipients to quickly
take jobs or engage in work-related activities. Despite the end of entitlement, the
relative financial benefits of moving from welfare to work have been enhanced by
other policy changes within and outside of welfare. For example, welfare reform
increased funds for state and federal child care subsidies for recipients and other
low-income families; most states increased earnings disregards, which lowered the
benefit reduction rate for recipients combining welfare and work; the earned
income tax credit increased dramatically in the mid-1990s; and the minimum wage
was increased in 1997, the same year that the State Child Health Insurance Pro-
gram was passed. 
Danziger et al. (2002) found that in Michigan income after taxes and work-related
child care and transportation expenses for welfare leavers increased by $2.63 for
every additional hour worked and that working leavers had higher incomes than did
nonworking welfare stayers. Moffitt and Winder (this issue) point out that much of
this income difference is due to (a) working leavers being more likely than welfare
stayers to live with other earners and (b) other earners residing with leavers earning
more than those living with recipients. Without these additional earnings, there
would be small income differences between working leavers and working recipients
(combiners).
Using data from the Three-City Study, they observe smaller income gaps between
working leavers and nonworking stayers and little difference between the incomes
of working leavers and combiners. Cross-state variation in welfare rules, especially
differences in earnings disregards, and differences in the demographic composition
of caseloads probably account for the smaller returns to work in Boston, Chicago,
and San Antonio than in Michigan. But, Moffitt/Winder are correct that, given the
risk of job loss, recipients would be better off if welfare rules were modified to
encourage more of them to be combiners for longer periods of time. 
They also emphasize that welfare reform contributed to an increase in single
mothers who are without work and without welfare. Our 2002 paper focused pri-
marily on those who moved from welfare to work. However, others (Loprest, 2003;
Turner, Danziger, & Seefeldt, 2004) have documented the increasing size and hard-
ships of nonworking leavers, especially those not living with other earners. We agree
that many nonworking leavers have lost economic ground since welfare reform and
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that more policy attention should be given to increasing their access to social serv-
ices, subsidized jobs, and/or cash assistance.
In this reply, we analyze additional panel data from Michigan and document that
it “pays to move from welfare to work” even when the contributions of additional
earners are excluded. We also document that combining work and welfare is a tran-
sitory state for most recipients over a four-year period. We then estimate fixed-
effects regressions to test Moffitt/Winder’s views on the benefits of being a working
leaver relative to being a combiner and show that the hourly returns to work for the
former exceeds that of the latter even without the earnings of others. 
TRENDS IN MONTHLY INCOME FOR CURRENT AND FORMER WELFARE RECIPIENTS 
Table 1 shows trends in four income measures (in constant 2001 dollars) from 1997 to
2001 for current and former recipients in Michigan; food stamps are counted as equiv-
alent to cash.1 Mean monthly earnings of respondents (including nonearners) grew by
68 percent, from $490 to $821 over four years. Net household income, defined as gross
income less federal income and payroll taxes, increased by 28 percent, from $1,401 to
$1,791.2 When the earnings of others are excluded, incomes grew by only 11 percent.3
The sum of respondents’ own earnings, TANF and food stamps shows little variation—
the 2001 value, $1,054 is only slightly higher than the 1997 value, $1,018.4 Thus, as
Moffitt/Winder emphasize, gains from rapid growth in earnings after welfare reform
were mostly offset by declining cash assistance and food stamps. 
1 Danziger et al. (2002) used data through the second wave (fall 1999), which Moffitt/Winder reanalyze.
Here we analyze four survey waves, through fall 2001.
2 Net monthly income does not count the earned income tax credit and state tax credits because most
women receive them as an annual payment. Danziger et al. (2002) reported net income less work-related
transportation and out-of-pocket child care expenses. These expenses were not gathered at Wave 1. Mean
net income less these expenses increased by 13 percent between 1998 and 2001, the same rate as did the
net income measure reported here.
3 Taxes are not subtracted from gross income due to the difficulty of imputing them to others’ earnings. 
4 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) income is based on administrative records here, not
on self-reports.
Table 1. Monthly economic well-being, 1997–2001, all Michigan respondents (constant
2001 $).
Mean Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3  Wave 4 
(Fall 1997) (Fall 1998) (Fall 1999) (Fall 2001)
Own earnings $490 $660 $763 $821
Net household income 1401 1592 1671 1791
Gross household income 
Less earnings of others 1189 1238 1215 1324
Own earnings  TANF 
Food stamps 1018 998 991 1054
Number of observations 713 653 595 543
Note: All Women’s Employment Study (WES) respondents present at a wave are included. Response
rates were 86, 93, 91 and 91 percent, at waves 1–4 respectively. There is no evidence that attrition has led
to a biased sample (Pape, 2004). 
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TRANSITIONS IN WORK/WELFARE STATUS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
After welfare reform, most respondents moved from being welfare recipients to being
working leavers even though Michigan did not adopt the federal five-year time limit on
cash assistance. Between 1997 and 2001, working leavers increased from 21.6 to 61.1
percent of respondents and combiners fell from 44.0 to 10.7 percent. Nonworking wel-
fare recipients fell from 30.3 to 12.9 percent and nonworking leavers increased from 4.1
to 15.3 percent. Although combiners were the largest group in 1997, they were the
smallest four years later. And, being a combiner is a transitory work/welfare status:
about two-thirds of combiners at one wave were not combiners at the next wave,
whereas three-quarters of working leavers continued in that status at the next wave. 
One indication of the gain to work is that the real hourly wage of leavers increases
relative to that of combiners. For the former, the mean increased from $7.71 to
$9.44 between fall 1997 and fall 2001; for combiners, it fell from $6.60 to $6.47.
And, working leavers were less likely to engage in activities to make ends meet, such
as pawning possessions or seeking food, shelter, or clothing from charity. In 2001,
26 percent of working leavers, but 42 percent of combiners and 58 percent of non-
working stayers engaged in one or more of five such activities (see Danziger et al.,
2002, Table 5 for a list of activities). 
MOFFITT/WINDER’S ESTIMATES OF THE RETURNS TO WORK
Moffitt/Winder report average and marginal measures of the returns to work for
Three-City respondents who received welfare at Wave 1 and were working leavers
or working stayers at Wave 2, about two years later. They conclude, “. . . that much
of the increase in earnings and income occurring when individuals go to work or
leave welfare is a flat, fixed amount that does not vary with how much they work.
This implies that work “pays” more if one is going to work from nonwork, but much
less if one simply works more, given that one is already working.” They show that
working leavers have smaller marginal returns to work than combiners—$2.39 vs.
$3.17 for own earnings.
We replicated their method for measuring returns to work using four years of data,
but the results differ (data not shown).5 The average and marginal returns are greater
in Michigan than in the three cities. For example, the marginal returns to work for
leavers and stayers are $3.35 and $3.76 per hour for net income in Michigan, but only
$0.89 and $1.79, respectively, in the three cities. For other income concepts, the aver-
age and marginal returns are greater in Michigan for leavers than for combiners. For
own earnings, leavers receive $4.04 per additional hour, combiners, $3.17; for gross
income less others’ earnings, $3.14 per hour for leavers, only $1.67 for combiners. 
Although Moffitt/Winder concluded that much of the gain “does not vary with
how much they work,” in Michigan the gain does increase with hours worked. And
using their method, the returns for working leavers exceeds that of combiners even
when others’ earnings are excluded. 
AN ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION OF THE FIXED-EFFECT REGRESSIONS
Moffitt/Winder’s method uses data only on initial wave welfare recipients who were
working at the final wave. We prefer an alternative specification that includes all
5 Results are reported in an earlier version of this reply at www.fordschool.umich.edu/research/poverty/
publications.htm; accessed October 19, 2004.   
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respondents (except those who received disability benefits during the study period)
at four waves and analyzes monthly income as a function of monthly hours and
welfare receipt. This fixed-effects model is described as follows:
Incomeit  α  β1  Hoursit  β2  Hoursit  (No Welfare)it
 β3  (Wage Reliant)it  β4  (No Work/No Welfare)it  Xitψ  ƒi  εit,
where  Xit represents a vector of demographic characteristics of individual  i at wave
t, and  ƒi is an individual-specific fixed effect. (No Welfare)it indicates that respon-
dent i did not receive welfare in the month prior to the wave t survey. Those not
receiving TANF are classified by work status, indicated by two variables: (Wage
Reliant)it, and (No Work/No Welfare)it. 
For the wage reliant, the marginal hourly return is β1 plus β2; for combiners it is
β1. Hence, β2 reflects the additional return for working leavers relative to that of
combiners. If Moffitt/Winder’s three-city results held in Michigan, β2 would not dif-
fer significantly from zero. If it pays to be a working leaver relative to being a com-
biner, β2 will be positive and significant. We expect a positive coefficient for two rea-
sons. First, the wage reliant worked more over the four-year sample period and have
higher wage rates than combiners. Second, as combiner’s earnings increase they
face an implicit tax rate—the marginal reduction in welfare benefits. A welfare
leaver working an additional hour does not face this implicit tax rate.
The lump-sum loss in benefits when a worker exits welfare is β3; it is β4 when a
nonworker exits. These losses may differ because nonworking leavers lose the max-
imum welfare benefit whereas combiners who exit welfare received smaller
monthly benefits at the time of exit.6 We expect both coefficients to be negative,
with β4 being more negative than β3. 
Table 2 shows regression results for net household income, gross income less
earnings of others, and the sum of own earnings, TANF, and food stamps. The
coefficients on the interaction terms of hours and the no welfare indicator vari-
able are positive and statistically significant for two of the three measures. A
wage-reliant woman gains $2.56 in net income per additional hour, $0.67 more
than a combiner gains. She gains $2.67 per additional hour in terms of gross
income less others’ earnings, $0.86 more than the combiner. She obtains $2.84 per
additional hour in the sum of earnings, TANF, and food stamps, $0.71 per hour
more than a combiner. 
The coefficients on the variables indicating wage reliance and no work/no wel-
fare are both negative in each equation, reflecting the lump-sum loss associated
with welfare exit. The loss is smaller for working than for nonworking leavers. For
the former, the loss is $60 of net monthly income, $100 of gross income less others’
earnings, and $101 in the sum of earnings, TANF, and food stamps. For nonwork-
ing leavers, the corresponding losses are $273, $486, and $660.
Compared to a nonworking stayer, a working leaver earns $2.56 to $2.84 per addi-
tional hour, so she has to work 23 to 38 hours per month to compensate for the
lump-sum loss, depending on the income definition. A combiner is better off than
a nonworking stayer by $1.81 to $2.13 per additional hour, but she does not incur
the lump-sum loss (β3). 
In Michigan, wage reliant respondents worked 156 hours per month and com-
biners 121 hours. Given these hours, a working leaver would have $339 more in net
6 A worker may exit welfare before earnings reach the phase-out level. For example, she may be eligible
for a small benefit, but the amount may be less than the transactions or stigma costs of welfare partici-
pation. This suggests that lump-sum losses for working leavers would be small.
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Table 2. Fixed-effect regressions predicting monthly income measures: Controlling for con-
current welfare status and interaction term of work hours and welfare status.
Gross HH Own Earnings 
Net Household Income less TANF  Food 
Income Earnings of Others Stamps
Monthly hours (β1) 1.89*** 1.81*** 2.13***
(0.41) (0.30) (0.23)
Hours * no welfare (β2) 0.67 0.86** 0.71**
(0.54) (0.40) (0.30)
Wage reliant (β3) –59.99 –100.39* –100.57**
(81.86) (60.09) (45.46)
No work/no welfare (β4) –272.72*** –485.58*** –659.56***
(79.87) (58.63) (44.35)
Married with husband 728.42*** –80.72 –89.42*
(96.38) (70.74) (53.52)
Cohabiting with unmarried 616.63*** 111.52** 27.39
partner (63.58) (46.67) (35.31)
# of children  age 6 –68.23* –24.72 12.26
(35.43) (26.01) (19.68)
Household size 148.81*** 22.31 6.83
(21.07) (15.47) (11.70)
Transportation problems –66.91 –32.25 12.93
(59.74) (43.85) (33.17)
Physical limitations & –18.10 –23.30 5.01
fair or poor health (62.45) (45.84) (34.68)
Child with health problems 4.12 14.89 7.38
(61.03) (44.80) (33.89)
Domestic violence –21.84 –12.77 7.19
(60.31) (44.27) (33.49)
Mental health problems –4.14 1.26 –2.38
(48.63) (35.70) (27.00)
Within R-squared 0.174 0.161 0.320
Note: Sample includes 618 respondents, comprising 2287 observations; standard errors are in parenthe-
ses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; income variables are measured in
constant 2001 dollars.
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monthly income than a nonworking stayer, $316 more in gross income less others’
earnings, or $342 more in the sum of earnings, TANF, and food stamps. The coeffi-
cients and these differences in hours suggest that the monthly income of a working
leaver would exceed that of a combiner by $110, $96, and $84 in terms of the three
measures. Again, in Michigan it pays to move from welfare to work.
The $339 net income difference between working leavers and nonworking stayers
and the $110 difference between working leavers and combiners are smaller than
the differences shown in Table 1 of Danziger et al. (2002), $635 and $444, respec-
tively, for two reasons. First, the article used self-reported TANF benefits, while we
now have administrative payment records.7 Second, the published table reported
averages that reflect uncontrolled heterogeneity among work/welfare groups. The
fixed-effect regression estimates reported here control for differences in demo-
graphic attributes and unobserved, time-invariant individual characteristics among
the work/welfare groups.
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this reply we analyzed new panel data from Michigan and found that descriptive
data, estimates using the Moffitt/Winder method, and our alternative fixed effect
estimates all suggest that it pays to move from being a nonworking welfare recipi-
ent to being a working leaver, even if the earnings of other household members are
ignored. And, working leavers earn more per additional hour of work than do com-
biners, even accounting for the lump-sum loss associated with leaving welfare.
Nonetheless, this income advantage, as Moffitt/Winder point out, is not large and is
smaller than our 2002 article implied. And, because the gains to work are higher in
Michigan than in Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio, one should be cautious in gen-
eralizing either set of results to the nation. 
Given the risk of subsequent job loss for leavers, we agree with Moffitt/Winder on
the need for policies, such as increased earnings disregards, that make it easier to
combine work and welfare. For example, Illinois, one of their sample states, has one
of the most generous disregard policies. This might partially account for their small
income difference between working leavers and combiners. Also, as they note, states
could choose to exempt months of welfare receipt from the time limit when recipi-
ents work at least 20 hours but still have low monthly earnings. There is also a need
for administrative changes to facilitate return to cash assistance and food stamps for
leavers who lose a job, as well as policies that increase the ability of welfare recipi-
ents and other low earners to qualify for unemployment insurance (Holzer, 2003).
In both Michigan and the three cities, working leavers and combiners have higher
incomes than do nonworking welfare recipients. This represents a major achieve-
ment of the 1996 reform and related policies implemented in the 1990s (that is,
1997 minimum wage increase, higher Earned Income Tax Credit). However, poverty
rates remain high among working leavers in these and other studies. 
Poverty could be further reduced by policies that raise the net income of workers,
such as increased child care subsidies. Only a minority of welfare leavers receive
child care subsidies. Danziger et al. (2004) have shown that Michigan mothers who
receive child care subsidies work more than those who do not. Other policies that
raise net income include expanding access to health insurance for the substantial
7 The updated Table 1 (not shown), based on administrative reports for TANF, shows an average $478
difference in net monthly income between the wage reliant and the welfare reliant and a $300 difference
between working leavers and combiners. 
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minority of working leavers who exhaust transitional Medicaid without securing
employer-provided insurance, raising the minimum wage, and encouraging the
adoption of state earned income tax credits (as 18 states have done). 
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